The Groves-Ledyard mechanism theoretically can solve the free-rider" problem in public good provision in certain environments. Two questions are of overriding importance in implementing the mechanism. The rst is related to the actual performance of the mechanism in general. The second is the choice of a punishment parameter", , which is the only parameter that is available for those who may w ant to actually use the mechanism. Thus the determination of the role of this variable on mechanism performance is fundamental for any advances along the lines of actual implementation. In studying the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, we show that the punishment parameter, plays a crucial role in the performance of the mechanism. By using = 1 and 100, we show that under the higher punishment parameter, the Groves-Ledyard equilibrium is chosen much more frequently; a higher level of the public good is provided and e ciency is higher. By examining two behavioral models, we show that a higher leads to an increase in the probability of an individual choosing a best response predicted by the model. The parameter, alone explains nearly 70 of the data in both the Cournot and the Carlson-Auster behavioral model. We also found that We w ould like to thank John Ledyard for his many insightful discussions and suggestions, Dave Grether, Scott Page, Arthur Skip" Lupia and an anonymous referee for their comments, and Hsing-Yang Lee for computer programming. Any remaining errors are our own.
Introduction
A widely recognized problem for economics and political science has been to explore institutional designs that might facilitate cooperation in an environment with public goods. For years a fundamental belief was that the achievement o f a P areto-optimal allocation of resources via decentralized mechanisms in the presence of public goods is incompatible with individual incentives. Theoretical and experimental work on the voluntary contribution mechanism indicates an underprovision of public goods, as a result of free-riding.
Groves and Ledyard 1977 proposed a decentralized mechanism in a general equilibrium model, in which through a government allocation-taxation scheme the behavioral equilibria Nash are Pareto optimal. That is, given the allocation-taxation scheme, consumers nd it in their self-interest to reveal their true preferences for the public goods" and the public goods are produced at an optimal level. Therefore the mechanism is incentive compatible, and it balances the budget both on and o the equilbrium path.
So far, the Groves-Ledyard mechanism has only been a paper process that exists only on the pages of a journal, but its importance should not be underestimated. It might b e possible to take the idea of a process discovered by Groves and Ledyard, re ne it, make i t operational and put it to use as an actual political economic process that solves naturally occuring problems. When, and if that occurs, the institutional design problem would have evolved to its next logical step. That possibility motivates the research reported in this paper.
The research strategy is to observe the behavior of the Groves-Ledyard process in the context of the simple situations that can be created in a laboratory and assess its performance relative to what it was created to do and relative to the theory upon which its creation rests.
Two questions are of overriding importance if we w ant to implement the mechanism. The rst is related to the actual performance of the GL mechanism in general. The second is the role of a punishment parameter", , which is the only parameter that is available for those who may w ant to actually use the GL mechanism. The GL mechanism is actually a family of mechanisms, depending on the choice of this punishment parameter 1 . F or practical implementation of the mechanism, information is needed about the performance of the system in response to an increase or decrease of this punishment parameter. Theory does not address this question except to suggest that if this particular type of punishment is too 1 Walker 1979, 1983 discussed some e ects of parameter choices.
high" the process will not respond at all. Such testing of the sensitivity of the di erent G L mechanisms under di erent parameters has not been performed.
In choosing the actual experimental environments, two drawbacks of the mechanism must be considered: it does not satisfy voluntary participation, i.e., an individual can be worse o as a result of participating in the process; in a general environment m ultiple equilibria 2 can exist. The way w e deal with the rst problem is to give e v ery subject an initial endowment. For the second problem, since the focus in this paper is to assess the mechanism relative to the theory and the role of the punishment parameter, a quasilinear environment is used, in which exists a unique Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium selection problem in a general environment is left for future research.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical features of the GL mechanism. Section 3 reviews previous experimental works motivated by the GL mechanism, with comparisons of experimental designs. Section 4 contains a description of the experimental design the environment, the process and the procedures. Section 5 gives a descriptive summary of data and some preliminary results, and then compares the predictions of di erent behavioral models to the data. In this section a logit analysis is used to identify and discuss the impact of the di erent parameters on the behaviors of the subjects. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Groves-Ledyard Mechanism
The GL mechanism allocates each individual's share of the cost of public good provision by C i x i j i ; i = X I q + 2 I , 1 I x i , i
i ; where 0 is the punishment parameter, I is the number of people in the economy, x i is individual i's message, indicating his proposed addition to the total amount of public good provided, and X = P i x i is the total amount of public good. De ne S i = P j6 =i x j as the sum of the proposed increments by all other members of the group except i, and i = S i =I as the mean of others' messages, and 2 i = P h6 =i x h , i 2 =I , 2 as the squared standard error of the mean of others' messages. q is the per unit cost of the public good.
Some features of the mechanism are important for understanding and implementing the mechanism. As can be observed from the tax function of the GL mechanism, two parameters, 2 See Bergstrom, Simon and Titus 1983. and I, de ne a family of GL mechanisms. Variations of the punishment parameter, , changes the penalty that is imposed on an individual for deviating from the mean of other players' messages. The other parameter is the size of the economy, I, i.e., the number of individuals in the economy.
In the experiments reported here the in uence of size on the properties of the equilibria is not considered, especially as the size of the economy grows towards in nity. T echnology is not up to the task. So a xed size of the economy w as chosen, and given the xed size, the punishment parameter was varied. Accordingly, e ects of the punishment parameter on the performance of the mechanism was assessed.
Preferences are induced on units of the abstract public good by an individually speci ed value function, V i X, which indicates the amount of money an individual will receive i f the group choice of the public good is X and if the individual pays nothing for it. At each level of public good decided by the group, an individual's net earning in dollars is NV i = V i X , C i x i jS i ; i , where C i x i jS i ; i is the amount of tax individual i pays if his proposed addition to the total amount of public good provided is x i , the sum of the proposed increments by all other members of the group except i is S i , and the squared standard error of the mean of others' messages is This equation simply says that each individual will report a desired quantity" of the public good which equates the marginal private bene t perceived with the marginal private cost perceived given the decisions of others.
The marginal cost of public good to individual i is C 0 i x i jS i ; i = q I + I , 1 I x i , i :
Therefore, changes in will a ect an individual's equilibrium message, x i . The e ects of punishment parameters on individuals' behaviors will be developed further later.
The Lindahl equilibrium X e , fV i X e g satis es
for the experimental environment. So, the sum of individual marginal values for the public good equals the marginal rate of transformation. Another important feature in the GL mechanism is that it balances the budget both on and o the equilibrium path, i.e., it guarantees a balanced budget for every X 0, i.e., P I i=1 C i x i jS i ; i = qX. This is achieved by the last term in the GL rule, the squared standard error of the mean of others' messages, 2 i . Including this term causes additional difculties in implementation by adding another dimension to the individuals' decision problem. But, it is crucial for keeping a balanced budget.
Previous Implementation
There have been two groups of experiments with mechanisms motivated by the GrovesLedyard mechanism. First, Vernon Smith 1979 did two sets of experiments, using a simpli ed version of the mechanism, which only balanced the budget in equilibrium, i.e., one needs to know the equilibrium in order to balance the budget. The complete GL mechanism balances budget both on and o the equilibrium path. In the Smith experiments the punishment parameter was set to be one.
Secondly, Harstad and Marresse hereafter shortened as HM 1981 HM , 1981 HM , 1982 had two sets of experiments motivated by the GL mechanism. The rst set of experiments did not satisfy a balanced budget condition: they used the Smith parameters, but with a di erent process the Seriatim process 3 . Their second set of experiments was a computerized version with a balanced budget both on and o the equilibrium path. Table 1 about here   Table 1 summarizes the main di erences of the Smith, HM and our experimental designs. The two Smith experiments and Harstad-Mirresse 1 do not satisfy the balanced budget constraint o the equilibrium path, so the mechanism they studied was not the actual GL mechanism. Harstad-Mirresse 2 use the complete version of the mechanism, and with di erent punishment parameters and number of subjects. We argue that changing the punishment parameters and number of subjects simultaneously, a s w as done in HarstadMirresse 2, does not allow one to study the exact impact of the two parameters; besides, the magnitude of changes were so small, that the e ects would be very di cult to discern in a lab environment. Indeed, the e ect of parameters are not discussed in Harstad and Marresse 1981. Neither experiment addressed the role of the punishment parameters in the performance of the mechanism.
Another important di erence between our implementation and the previous attempts resides in the processes used. Both the Smith process and the Seriatim process requires unanimity, which might add unwanted complexity to the static GL mechanism. They have the common shortcoming of involving much c heap talk and manipulation. Since the subjects are only paid when agreements are reached, they need not be responsible for each decision they make. From our pilot experiments using the Smith process 4 and from Banks, Plott and Porter 1987, unanimity w as found to decrease the e ciency of the system. Therefore, because of the unanimity feature we discard these two processes and use a completely di erent process in the experiments reported here.
Testbed Environment
The testbed environment re ects both technical and theoretical considerations. A major consideration of any eld application is that the process of the public goods provision covers the cost of the public good. Thus we w ant to study only processes that satisfy the balanced budget property under both conditions of equilibrium" and disequilibrium". In addition we are interested in the in uence of the magnitude of the punishment parameter. These considerations taken together with the technological problems that they can cause, motivated an experimental design in which the size of the economy is xed and the punishment parameter is varied. The economic environment, the institutional process and the experimental procedures are discussed in the sections below.
The Economic Environment
In all experiments a simple constant unit cost, q, is used to produce the public good. Preferences are induced on units of the abstract public good by an individually speci ed value function, V i X, which indicates the amount of money an individual will receive if the group choice of the public good is X and if the individual pays nothing for it.
The Figure  1 . Subject 1's marginal valuation for the public good is negative at all levels; i.e., it is a public bad for him. The other four players' marginal valuations are also quite di erent from each other. At the equilibrium, where X = 5, both Subject 4 and 5 have marginal valuations higher than the marginal cost of the public good, while Subject 1 and 2 have marginal valuations below the marginal cost. In a voluntary contribution situation, we w ould expect Subject 4 and 5 to contribute close to the optimal amount of the public good. One question to be posed is whether, or how likely it is that individual subjects follow their Lindahl equilibria under di erent punishment parameters. As shown in Table 2 .1, when = 1, the punishment for deviation from the mean of others is not severe, therefore their Lindahl equilibrium messages vary from each other. When = 100, however, the incentive for converging to the mean of others' messages is so strong that all equilibrium messages are squeezed" towards one. The distribution of costs also moves toward uniform. In both cases, the group optimal quantity of public good is 5.
The Institutional Process
Implementation of the mechanism is based on a Periodic Process. That is, on each trial, each subject i chooses a message, x i , and sends it to the central computer. The computer calculates the total level of public good, X = P I i=1 x i , the sum of others' proposals, the variances of others' proposals and each subject's net payo , and sends the information to the subjects' screens. The subjects are paid each trial for each decision they make. The process repeats for T periods, which are announced in the instructions.
This process di ers from those used in other experiments. Here, subjects are paid for each decision. All messages involve commitment and are communicated under condition of incentives. Theoretically, relative to other experiments there is less incentive for cheap talk. Our pilot experiments comparing the Periodic Process with the Smith Process suggest that less cheap talk and manipulative behaviors existed in the Periodic Process, which is also more faithful to the original static mechanism.
Experimental Procedures
Four experiments were conducted using Caltech undergraduates. While most of the subjects had participated in computerized economic experiments before, none had participated in a Groves-Ledyard experiment. Each experiment consisted of two sessions. And each session consisted of 30 periods, with the rst ve periods being the practice rounds without payment. The practice rounds were used to instruct the subjects about the functions of di erent keys, how to send in a proposal and how to read and record a result from the screen see Computer Instructions in Appendix A. Two experiments started with 30 trials of = 1 design followed by 30 trials of the = 100 design; and another two experiments had the reversed order. Each experiment lasted between 1 and 1.5 hours. Table 2 .2 summarizes these four experiments. At the beginning of each experiment, each subject had a set of instructions, a set of payo tables and record sheet. Because we use the complete version of the GL mechanism, the payo tables are necessarily three-dimensional 5 . The experimenter read the instructions and taught the subjects how to use the keyboard, how to send messages and how to record results from the computer. After the Computer Instruction, the subjects were required to nish the Review Questions, which w ere designed to test subjects' understanding of instructions. Afterwards, the experimenter reviewed the answers to the questions and answered any questions. After this, the subjects read and signed the Financial Agreement, which required them to work in the lab in case of negative earning see Appendix A.
When a period of an experiment began, each subject sent his her proposed addition of the public good through the computer. The central computer calculated the total level of the projectX, the sum of other subjects' proposed additions S i , the variance of other subjects' additions 2 i , o r o i as in the instructions, and the net value of the project for each subject NV i , o r P i as in the instructions. The information was sent back to the subjects' screens. The subjects then wrote the information in the record sheet. Subjects were strongly encouraged to refer to their payo tables before and after each decision. Most subjects appeared to study their payo tables before sending messages and after receiving the feedback. The process was repeated for 25 periods. At the end of an experiment, the subjects added their total earnings in francs for all 25 periods and converted them to dollar payments. The conversion rate was announced at the beginning of the experiments and was written on the blackboard for their attention.
Results

Descriptive Summary of Data
The important basic results obtained from the raw data are listed as Result 1 through Result 4. Together these four results provide the rst facts about the overall performance of the classic GL mechanism. A more detailed examination of individual behavioral models and the principles that might underlie individual decisions is reserved for sections 5.2 and 5.3. Table 3 contains the aggregate results of the experiments. Each session has two sets of experiments, marked by a and b. Experiment a precedes experiment b. The order of the experiments is a treatment v ariable. In two sessions 0219-93 and 0401-93 = 1 trials are conducted before the = 100 trials, and vice versa in the other two experiments. N stands for the numbers of trials in each session, each session has 25 trials except for 0305-93b which has 26 trials. The notation, f i , is used to denote the frequency that a subject proposes the addition i, and f i is used to denote the equilibrium proposal for the subjects. Though the aggregate level of public good can range from -10 to 30, only the values actually chosen in the experiments are listed. Table 3 about here   Table 3 continued about here Results 1 to 3 are group level results. Results 1 and 2 tell us that the promise provided by theory, that the GL mechanism can be used to solve the public goods problems in this type of environment is true in fact. The variable is important because when it is increased the e ciency of the process increases and the aggregate level of the public good is closer to the optimal. Result 3 further con rms that has a role to play in the performance of the mechanism.
RESULT 1 : The average group e ciency increases when increases.
SUPPORT. The last column of Table 3 SUPPORT. The level of public good provided for each experiment and the mean level are presented in Table 3 continued. The average level of public good provided is 4.70 when = 1, and 4.91 when = 100. The group e cient level, X = 5 , i s c hosen 28 of the time when = 1 and 47 of the time when = 100. 2 Although the group e ciency level the GL equilibrium is chosen signi cantly less frequently when is low, the overall e ciency is still above ninety percent. This is because the actual group payo , P i V i X ,C i = P i V i X ,qX, aggregate out 's incentive e ect on the individual's cost share. The function of the punishment parameter is to induce the group e cient level of public good to be chosen more frequently. So the e ciency is slightly higher when = 100, but in either case it is above ninety percent o n a verage.
The aggregate data can have a tendency to hide the potential importance of . First, the cost of adjustment as created by is a type of zero-sum game. The cost paid by one individual is a bene t received by another. Thus the cost of adjustment cannot appear in the aggregate data. In addition, because the e ciency levels of the mechanism are so high, even under low levels of , there would seem to be little room for the variable to have a n e ect. The next result signals that signi cant e ects of exist in the data and thus the result serves as a basis for a more detailed analysis of individual behavior.
RESULT 3 : The increase of reduces dispersion of outcomes across experiments.
SUPPORT. Table 3 . The subjects are numbered so that an individual indexed k in one experiment has exactly the same induced preferences as the individual indexed k in the other experiments. A brief review of the individual statistics will help one read the tables and understand the peculiar aspects of the detailed behaviors. Table 4 .1 about here When = 1, subject 1's equilibrium choice is x 1 = ,1. In the four sessions, half of the subjects who have the incentive structure of subject 1 choose -2 more frequently, and the other half chooses their equilibrium, -1, more frequently. O n a verage, -1 is chosen slightly less frequently than -2, though it is still one of the bimodal distributions. When = 100, however, the equilibrium choice for subject 1, x 1 = 1 , i s c hosen 71 of the time on average. And, it is the most frequent c hoice for every subject; it is chosen more than 56 of the time. When = 1, the payo for x 1 = ,1, denoted by P ,1 is strictly greater than the payo s of other choices only at the equilibrium, S 1 = 6 . F or any slight disturbances, P ,1 no longer dominates other choices. For S 1 2 3; 5 , P ,2 and P ,1 round up to exactly the same integer values. And for S 1 2, we h a ve P ,2 P ,1 . Therefore, when the choices vary around the equilibrium value, the probability o f c hoosing ,2 instead of ,1 is rather high. When = 100, however, the equilibrium choice strongly dominates other choices not only at the equilibrium, but also in the neighborhood of the equilibrium. Table 4 .2 about here When = 1, three out of the four subject 2's choose their equilibrium, x 2 = 0 more frequently than other alternatives. On average, the Nash equilibrium, which i s c hosen 50 of the time, is the mode of the distribution. Compared with Subject 1's payo structure, the equilibium choice weakly dominates the other payo s at three values: S 2 = 4 ; 5; 6. When S 2 4, P 1 P 2 ; when S 2 6, P ,1 P 0 . Therefore, the equilibrium value of 1, is chosen most frequently, and both ,1 and 0 are chosen with substantial frequencies. When = 100, the Nash equilibrium, x 2 = 1 , i s c hosen 75 of the time on average. Again, the equilibrium choice strongly dominates other choices at and around the equilibrium, thus providing strong incentives for the subjects to play Nash. For subject 3's, the average frequency of choosing the equilibrium, x 3 = 1 when = 1 , though highest among the frequencies of the same punishment parameter, is less than half of the frequency of choosing the equilibrium when = 100. When = 1, for S 3 4, P 2 P 1 , and for S 3 4, P 0 P 1 , which partly explains why 0 is chosen 31 of the time, and 2 is chosen 18 of the time. Table 4 .4 about here For Subject 4's, when = 1 , P 1 P 2 for S 4 3; P 3 P 2 for S 4 3. Conjecture, in session 0304-93b and 0305-93b, most of the time S 4 3. Again, when we increase to 100, the average frequency of attained Nash is almost three times as high as when = 1 . SUPPORT. In Table 4 . 
Behavioral Models
The above analysis makes clear that individual behavior is important. This section is an attempt to develop some intuition about the principles of individual behavior that might b e operating in the context of the mechanism. T w o standard models Ledyard 1978 can be used as benchmarks. These are the Cournot model, which has individuals using information only one period back and the other is the Carlson-Auster model, which has individuals using information from all past periods and giving them equal weight.
The underlying rationale for these models is described below. Recall, an individual's value function for the public good is For our design and environment, the set of parameters are presented in Table 5 . Table 6 . Table 6 SUPPORT. Table 6 shows that 40 of the choices on average are Cournot best response when = 1, while 80 of the choices can be categorized as Cournot behavior when = 100. RESULT 6 : When = 1 , c onvergence to Cournot behavior is rare, slow and unstable; when = 100, the convergence is fast and stable for most of the subjects.
SUPPORT. All of the experiments exhibit similar patterns as those shown in Figure 2, i.e., when = 100 convergence to Cournot behavior is fast and stable, when = 1 the convergence is slow and unstable, and over half of the time, it does not converge at all. 2
The Cournot model postulates that subjects base their best responses only on the information they receive in the previous period. An alternative model is that subjects base their best responses on all the information they receive in the previous periods. How m uch w eight each subject puts on past information might di er among periods and subjects. Here, we examine a simple version of such a model, when all previous periods are given equal weight by all subjects. Carlson-Auster Expectations Model postulates that each subject bases best responses upon the average of all previous period's information. The result is that the Carlson-Auster model in which subjects are seen as averaging out all the past information and then optimizing is more accurate than the Cournot model which predicts that the subjects only look at the previous period before optimizing.
Logit Analysis: Incentives and Choice Behavior
From the above classi cation of raw data, the role of in individual subjects' decision to use Cournot best responses or Carlson-Auster best responses is obvious. The purpose now is to explore the possibility that other factors might contribute to individual's tendency to use either Cournot or Carlson-Auster best responses. Apart from , could the probability of individual choices be related to the parameters of their preferences for the public good? What other factors a ect the probability of individual choices?
The principle of design consistency" Plott 1993 requires that the reasons for choices be studied. If a process is expected to have robust performance properties, it should be working for the right reasons. That is, the process should be working according to the basic theory and principles that were used to design the process in the rst place. Therefore, we proceed by an examination of possible relationships among the induced preferences, the punishment parameter and individual subjects' probabilities of choosing Cournot responses. Analysis of the Carlson-Auster model can be done in a similar way.
A widely held belief in the experimental literature is that the predicative capacity o f game theoretic or economic theoretic models improves as the level of incentive increases. This presumption plays such an active role in the analysis of this section that we give i t a name.
The General Incentive Hypothesis. The error of game theoretic and economic theoretic models decreases as the level of incentive increases.
Applying the General Incentive Hypothesis to this analysis, let us consider a subject's probability o f c hoosing his Cournot response, P i C, as a decreasing function of his net gain from deviating from Cournot. We use NV PROPOSITION. An increase in or B i will cause the subjects to choose Cournot responses with a higher probability.
Therefore, in the logit analysis, we consider two independent v ariables: , the punishment parameters and B i , the coe cient of individuals' value functions for the public good. The dependent v ariable is a discrete choice variable, y, which equals one if a subject makes a Cournot response, and zero otherwise. Therefore, the model is
Coe cients, t-statistics in brackets, log likelihood and the percentages correctly predicted for each model are given in Table 8 . Table 8 about here For the Cournot hypothesis, we consider two logit models, C 1 and C 2 . The simple basic model C 1 has only one independent v ariable, x = , i.e., a player's decision depends only upon . I n C 2 , B i is added as an independent v ariable to the basic model.
In testing the impact of di erent parameters on the probability of Carlson-Auster hypothesis, we devise similar logit models, and get models CA i , which are tabulated in the last two columns of Table 8 .
As we see in the model C 1 , in the basic model for Carlson-Auster hypothesis, CA 1 , alone explains nearly 70 of the data. A consistent pattern in all four models is the positive and signi cant impact of and B i on the choice of best responses behavior, which con rms our observations from the classi cation of the raw data and theoretical deduction.
RESULT 8 : The single most important factor that a ects the subjects' probabilities of choosing best responses is . A n increase in leads to an increase in the probability of an individual choosing his best response, in both the Cournot and the Carlson-Auster behavioral models.
SUPPORT. In basic model C 1 , alone is able to correctly predict 69.948 of the observations. In CA 1 , alone explains 66 of the data. In all four models, the coe cients of are signi cant at 99 level, and are positive, which s a ys that an increase in leads a subject to choose Cournot responses with higher probability. 2 RESULT 9 : The preference p arameter, B i , has a signi cant and positive impact on the probability of an individual choosing his best response. An increase in B i leads to an increase in the probability of an individual choosing his best response, in both the Cournot and the Carlson-Auster behavioral model.
SUPPORT. In C 2 , B i is signi cant at the 90 level; in CA 2 , B i is signi cant at 99 level.
In both models, the coe cients of B i are positive. In CA 2 , the percentage of data predicted rises from 66.425 to 69.534 after B i is added as an independent v ariable. 2
The tendency of an individual to use a Cournot-type response is related to the details of the individual's preferences. The level of B i , which has a negative impact on an individual's marginal value of the public good, also in uences his tendency to give a Cournot or Cournot-related response. An increase in B i leads to an increase in the probability o f an individual choosing Cournot. This is consistent with the General Incentive Hypothesis and the Proposition about the probability of an individual choosing best-responses. SUPPORT. The experimental literature suggests that the greater is the marginal value of a public good, the more is the tendency of an individual to voluntarily contribute to public goods e.g. Isaac, McCue and Plott 1985, Isaac and Walker 1988, Palfrey and Prisbrey 1992. That is, if marginal rate of substitution between the public good and the private good increases then the individual values the public good more relative to the private good, and is willing to contribute more private good for the production of public good 7 . Thus the individual is less likely to follow the Cournot strategy for no provision of public goods. That is, as the bene t of the Cournot responses go down, the frequency of its use goes down. Therefore, in two completely di erent mechanisms, the parameters of individual's induced preferences have a consistent impact on an individual's probability o f c hoosing best responses. Thus all of these observations are consistent with a general pattern of observation that connect the level and structure of rewards to the accuracy of an economic or game theoretic model 8 . 2
The logit analysis is consistent with the observation and Proposition about the impact of the punishment parameter, , and the preference parameter, B i on an individual's probability of choosing the best responses. Regardless of which behavioral model is imposed, an increase in supports the performance of the model.
Conclusions
On paper the Groves-Ledyard mechanism solves the free rider problem in certain economic environments. The free-rider problem has been the cornerstone of the problem of public goods provision and the Groves-Ledyard process promises a solution. The research reported here demonstrates that if the GL process is made operational through an implementation called a periodic process", then in a simple quasilinear environment the promise of the theory can be realized.
The e ectiveness of the GL solution to the public goods problem is closely related to a special parameter that we h a ve called the punishment" parameter. As the level of punishment" is elevated from a level = 1 to a level = 100, the e ciency of the operation of the process increases from 91 to 98 and the average level of provision increases from 4.7 units to 4.9 units, which is to be compared with an optimum of 5 units. Furthermore, an increase in the level of substantially decreases the dispersion of the outcomes across experiments, thereby suggesting that it in uences the reliability of the process.
In any testbed" experiments of the type reported here, it is useful to perform what has been called design consistency checks" See Plott 1993 to determine if the reasons that a process is working are given by the basic theory and principles that were used to design the process in the rst place. A process might be observed working but it might b e w orking for the wrong reason.
The consistency check on the mechanism reveals that over half of the individuals are exhibiting the type of behavior that is assumed by the principles of the GL model. That is, over half of the individual choices can be viewed as Cournot responses or, more accurately, a s optimal responses based on a belief that other individuals will be choosing on average as they have c hosen in the past the Carlson-Auster model. The response of individual behavior to increases in is to increase the frequency of Cournot-type responses and converge more rapidly to such responses.
The focus on the punishment parameter creates another interesting question relevant t o the actual implementation of the GL processes. Our results demonstrate that an increase in punishment increases the instance of Cournot type responses on which the mechanism depends. However, observing that the mechanism performs better when = 100 than when = 1 does not lead to the conclusion that the higher the punishment parameter is, the better the mechanism performs. To illustrate the point, we consider what happens when So when is very large, the subject's best response, if he follows Cournot behavior, is to choose the mean of other subjects' last period message, to avoid being punished by the large . Then we can induce a subject's best response at period t, given the initial choices of all subjects. Let subject i's initial move at time zero be x We can see that, given a large enough and long enough repetition, all subject's choices converge towards the mean of the initial choices, which can be anything. So, from our experiments and theoretical deduction, it is clear that as increases from one on, the performance of the mechanism improves, but as it goes to in nity, the performance declines. The optimal choice of remains an open question.
Another open question for future research is the performance of the mechanism when there are multiple equilibria. We studied a quasilinear environment with a unique equilibrium. It would be interesting to see which equilibrium will be selected in a more general environment with multiple equilibria.
The institutional design problem identi ed in the opening paragraphs of this paper are beginning to be solved. It is possible to align at least one normative criterion e ciency with the proper incentives. The paper processes when brought i n to the context of operational process work substantially as expected. The magnitude and nature of the incentives are important but they are important i n w ays that make i n tuitive sense. Whether or not the processes themselves like the GL process will ultimately provide the tools needed by those who wish to design process for implementation is the eld remains to be seen.
Appendix A. Experiment Instructions
You are about to participate in a decision process in which one of numerous competing alternatives will be chosen. This is part of a study intended to provide insight i n to certain features of decision processes. If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions you may earn a considerable amount of money. Y ou will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
This decision process will proceed as a series of trials during which a project level will be determined and nanced. The level" can be negative, zero or positive units", the exact level of which m ust be determined. Attached to the instructions you will nd a series of tables, which describes the value to you of decisions made during the process, called the Payo Tables. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.
During each period a level of the project will be determined. For the rst unit provided during a period you will receive the amount listed in row 1 of the Redemption Value Sheet. If a second unit is also provided during the period, you will receive the additional amount listed in row 2 of the Redemption Value Sheet. If a third unit is provided, you will receive, in addition to the two previous amounts, the amount listed in row 3, ect. As you can see, your individual total payment is computed as a sum of the redemption values of speci c units. These totals of redemption values are tabulated for your conveniece on the right hand side of the Redemption Value Sheet.
The payo each period, which i s y ours to keep, is the di erences between the total of redemption values of units of the project provided and your individual expentures on the project. All values are stated in francs and can be converted into cash at a rate of francs per dollar at the end of the experiment. Suppose, for example, your Redemption Value Sheet was as below and two units were provided. TotalRedemptionV alue  units  ofSpecificUnits  ofAllUnits  francs  francs  1  2500  2500  2  1500  4000  3 1000 5000
ProjectLevel RedemptionV alue
Your redemption value for the two units would be 4000 and your payo s would be computed by substracting your individual expenditures from this amount. If 3 units were provided, the redemption value would be determined by the redemption values of the rst and second unit plus the redemption value of the third unit, that is, 2500 + 1500 + 1000 = 5000:
Each unit of the project costs francs. Hence, total cost for a project is times the project size. Your expenditure toward the total project cost for a trial is determined from your decision and the decisions of all others. Note that the redemption values can be negative. Your expenditures can also be negative. That is, rather than paying for the project you are paid.
Your individual decisions will in uence both the nal level of the project chosen by the group and your individual expenditures on the project. Recall, your payo s from the experiment will be the di erence between the redemption values positive or negative that are determined by the level of the project chosen and your individual expenditures positive or negative. These will be explained in turn.
Project level determination X Each period each individual will choose a proposed addition x to the status quo of zero provision. This proposed addition can be any amount ranging from to . These amounts will be added together to get the total of proposed additions X. This total is the project level that will be chosen.
Level of individual expenditures c The level of your individual expenditures depends upon your individual proposed addition x, the proposed additions of other participants S and the variability among the proposed additions of the other participants o. The actual formula is somewhat cumbersome 9 , so a table that summarizes all of the relevant information will be used instead.
Payo Table The payo table will summarize both the redemption value of the level of the project chosen and the level of individual expenditures that you will incur depending upon the choices of additions that you and other participants make. This table is a rather large table contained in your instructions. The following example will demonstrate how you read it. The numbers in the example are completely arbitrary and in general have n o relationship to the actual table that you will be using. The purpose is only to help you to understand how to read the real table.
* Since it is a sum it is denoted by S. T o start, nd the example table for which S, the sum of the additions of others, is equal to 13. The top row of the table lists the possible choices that you might make for your own proposed addition, x. The amounts that you have as options in this example range from -5 to +5. Of course these might di er from the options that might exist on the real table.
The left column of the table contains measures of the variability of the proposed additions of the other participants, o. This variability measure re ects how scattered the additions of others are. For example if all of the other participants give the exact same number then there is no scatter at all and the variability is zero. Suppose that everyone gives a di erent n umber but all numbers di er very little, then the scatter is low as is the measure of variability. A s a shorthand we will use the term variance for this measure of variability of the additions of other participants.
Suppose that S is 13 and that the variance of the additions of others is 3.46. If you chose a proposed addition equal to -2 then your payo is 67. That is, your payo is determined by the sum of the additions of others, the variance and your own addition. Each e n try of the table is your payo that corresponds to your choice and the choices of the other participants. The payo could have been calculated from the formulas. Since S is 13 and you choose -2 the project level chosen is 11. The redemption value for 11 units would then be determined and the individual expenditures would also be computed by formula and substracted. The table does all of these calculations for you.
Another example might be useful. Suppose S is 16, variance is 9.67 and your proposed addition is 5. The example table indicates a payo of -409 that you would get from such a pattern of decisions.
It is crucial that you go check y our payo tables before and after each decision. As you can see that your choice, x, decides which column you will end up; the others' choices decide which table and which r o w of that table you will end up.
There will be 30 trials for each experiment. The rst 5 trials of each experiment will be practice trials. You will not be paid for these practice trials. Starting from the 6th trial, you will be paid for each decision you make.
Your le includes a record sheet at the last page of each set of experiment, for you to record the results of each trial. At the end of each trial, you should record your proposed addition, x, in the rst row; the sum of proposals of others, S, in the second row; the variances of others, o, in the third row; and your net payo , P, in the fourth row.
Feel free to earn as much cash as you can. Are there any questions?
Computer Instructions At the beginning of each trial, you are free to enter any proposed addition, x, b e t ween ,2 and 6, and then press the F-10 key to send it to the central computer. If you want to send a negative n umber, enter the number rst and then the negative sign. If you would like t o c hange your selection, use the Back Space key to delete the selection, and then enter your new selection. Now go ahead and enter a number. Notice if you enter a number out of the ,2 and 6 range, the computer will tell you that your choice is out of range and you need to change your selection. Now e v erybody please use the Back Space key to erase your choice, and then type in a negative n umber by t yping the number rst and then the negative sign. Now please press the F-10 key and then con rm it by t yping y. Once you con rm your choice by t yping y, y ou cannot change your choice anymore. After everyone sends their choices, the computer will calculate the sum of proposals of others, S, the variances of other members, o, and your corresponding payo for this trial, P, and send these numbers to your screen. This process will be repeated on each trial. Now go ahead and record the result of the rst trial to the rst column of your record sheet. 
